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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

OK
Communist China: Peiping has announced an extensive reshuffling of government officials at the deputy ministerial level. More than 400 appointments have been announced, but most of these are reappointments; a lesser number represent transfers to posts of comparable authority. Only about 20 officials--some of whom may have opposed the regime's recent policies--appear to have lost out in the shuffle. The personnel changes and some simultaneous organizational changes appear to have been designed principally to avoid a repetition of the serious economic dislocations which developed last year.

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OK
Bloc Leaders' Meeting in Peiping: A top-level meeting of Communist bloc leaders will apparently take place in Peiping during the Chinese tenth anniversary celebrations in early October. When Khrushchev goes to Peiping after his American trip, he will be accompanied or met there by "representatives" of the bloc countries who, together with the highest Chinese officials, will hear his report and comments on the results of the trip, according to the Yugoslav ambassador in Prague, who received his information from Czech Deputy Foreign Minister Gregor. Gregor, who was formerly Czech ambassador to Communist China, also said that he is now busy briefing the Czech delegation, which will include Antonin Novotny, first secretary of the Czech Communist party. In addition to the ceremonial purposes of the trip, Khrushchev will probably try to iron out any existing differences between Moscow and Peiping and also seek to allay Chinese Communist apprehensions over the effect of his talks in Washington on Communist Chinese international objectives, particularly Taiwan.)

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Nehru visit to Iran: (Preliminary reports of Indian Prime Minister Nehru's visit to Afghanistan and Iran confirm earlier impressions that he went to those countries to study their relations with the orbit rather than to give advice. Nehru made no effort to influence the Shah in his relations with the USSR in his initial conversations in Tehran and did not urge Iran to withdraw from CENTO or to adopt a neutralist foreign policy. His remarks both in Tehran and earlier in Kabul indicated that New Delhi) 25X1

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would continue its neutral policy but that it is up to each nation to choose its own course of action.) [redacted]

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Watch Committee conclusions: Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Iran.)

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Laos: While the dissidents, with probable North Vietnamese assistance, continue to have the objective of establishing themselves in a strong position which they could use as the basis for political bargaining or for the expansion of military operations, dissident activity will probably continue at a low level during the presence of the UN fact-finding mission in Laos.)

Middle East: The initiation of significant hostilities is unlikely in this area in the immediate future.)

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III. THE WEST

[redacted]

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Argentina: President Frondizi has requested court action to dissolve the Communist party and to withdraw its electoral recognition. He is particularly concerned over threats by supporters of the outlawed Peronista party to back Communist candidates in the March 1960 congressional elections and over the Communist and Peronista labor unity pact to undermine the US-backed stabilization program. Frondizi and the armed forces are preparing for any violence that may ensue. [redacted]

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Chinese Communist Government Personnel Changes

Peiping has announced an extensive reshuffling of government officials at the deputy ministerial level. More than 400 appointments have been announced, but most of these are reappointments; a lesser number represent transfers to posts of comparable authority. Only about 20 officials--some of whom may have opposed the regime's recent policies--appear to have lost out in the shuffle. There is no indication so far that these will be subjected to further punishment.

The across-the-board reshuffle of deputy ministers seems to have been undertaken to improve efficiency and to strengthen some ministries by adding more deputies--a maneuver which Peiping has tried periodically during the past ten years. Peiping may also believe that the appointments will stimulate the enthusiasm of officials for the regime's policies.

The three former coordinating staff offices for heavy industry and construction, light industry, and transport and communications have apparently been amalgamated. Direction of this new body has been given Li Fu-chun and Po I-po, his deputy, who are also responsible for long-range and annual economic planning, respectively. This move may have been designed to avoid a repetition of the serious dislocations which developed last year, and primary responsibility for preventing this will apparently fall to Li and Po, whose public statements have indicated general sympathy with Mao's "leap forward" program of the past year.

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Prime Minister Nehru's Visit to Iran

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(Preliminary press and diplomatic reports regarding Prime Minister Nehru's recently concluded visits to Kabul and Tehran indicate that he made no effort to settle Afghan and Iranian problems, that he did not actively oppose CENTO, and that he did not urge Iran to adopt a policy of neutrality.)

(In both capitals Nehru made it clear in public remarks that India would continue its present neutral course regardless of occasional irritations and provocations. His attitude toward others, however, is illustrated by his answer to a newsman's request in Tehran that he give his opinion on the new Central Treaty Organization. Nehru said, "I have always lived far removed from all pacts. I don't suppose a change of name makes it different from what it was. This is simply my personal opinion. It is for each country to decide." This new restraint on Nehru's part has been evident since the Tibetan revolt broke out last March.)

(The Shah of Iran stated that in his talks with Nehru, the Indian prime minister did not attempt to change Iranian policy toward the USSR or give advice of any kind. Minister of Court Ala said that Nehru made no effort to influence the Shah in his relations with the USSR. The Shah added that Nehru is a much-changed man and that he is more realistic in his outlook toward Communist countries. Nehru indicated to the Shah that aggression should be resisted.)

(These preliminary reports of Nehru's visits confirm earlier impressions that he traveled to Afghanistan and Iran primarily to study their relations with the orbit and to acquire background material to guide his own thinking about world problems rather than to give advice.)

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III. THE WEST

Argentine President Asks Courts to Dissolve Communist Party

Charging the Communist party with subversion, Argentine President Frondizi requested on 22 September that the courts dissolve the party and withdraw its electoral recognition. Behind this action is his concern over threats by supporters of the outlawed Peronista party to back Communist candidates in the March 1960 congressional elections. He is also concerned over an intensification of strike pressure against austerity measures under the US-backed stabilization program as a result of the labor unity pact signed by the Communists and Peronistas in August.

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The government also anticipates an increase in violence from Communist and Peronista agitation.

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The armed forces strongly endorse anti-Communist measures and a firm policy against labor agitation. The new war secretary has warned that the army would "come out with all its power if foreign interests endanger the country" through strike action.

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